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Abstract 
We study the two-color problem by Ellsberg (1961) with the modification that the 
decision maker draws twice with replacement and a different color wins in each draw. 
The 50-50 risky urn turns out to have the highest risk conceivable among all prospects 
including the ambiguous one, while all feasible color distributions are 
mean-preserving spreads to one another. We show that the well-known second-order 
sophisticated theories like MEU, CEU, and REU as well as Savage’s first-order 
theory of SEU share the same predictions in our design, for any first-order risk 
attitude. Yet, we observe that substantial numbers of subjects violate the theory 
predictions even in this simple design.  
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1. Introduction 
The Ellsberg Paradox refers to the outcome from Ellsberg’s (1961) thought 
experiments, that missing information about objective probabilities can affect 
people’s decision making in a way that is inconsistent with Savage’s (1954) 
subjective expected utility theory (SEU). Facing two urns simultaneously in 
Ellsberg’s two-color problem, one with 50 red and 50 black balls (the risky urn) and 
the other with 100 balls in an unknown combination of red and black balls (the 
ambiguous urn), most people prefer to bet on the risky urn whichever the winning 
color is. This phenomenon is often called ambiguity aversion. Many subsequent 
experimental studies confirm Ellsberg’s finding as for example surveyed in Camerer 
and Weber (1992).    
To rationalize the Ellsberg-type ambiguity aversion by extending the SEU theory, 
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) develop the maxmin expected utility (MEU) theory 
where the decision maker (DM) has a set of prior beliefs associated with the 
ambiguous prospect and assign the minimal SEU utility based on this set as their 
MEU utility. Given MEU, it is not a paradox anymore.1  
This seminal work sets off a large literature on what Ergin and Gul (2009) called 
“second-order probabilistically sophisticated” preferences. Abandoning Savage’s 
axiom of “reduction of compound lotteries”, various theories on preferences on 
second or higher order priors have been developed that are also capable of 
rationalizing the original Ellsberg paradox. Among these, the smooth ambiguity or 
Recursive Expected Utility (REU) model by Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) 
has the most operational form by assuming one utility function for each belief order in 
a space of two-stage lotteries.2 Recent applications of REU on studies of asset pricing 
 
1 Schmeidler (1989) develops the related Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) theory based on axioms. 
The MEU/CEU theory has been further generalized to the general multiple-prior approach. For further 
literature, see Casadesus-Masanell, Klibanoff, and Ozdenoren (2000), Eichberger and Kelsey (2009).  
2 For further two-stage approaches to ambiguity aversion, see Chew, Karni and Safra (1987), Nau 
(2006), Segal (1987, 1990), and Seo (2009) among others. 
show that it indeed enables an internally consistent calibration of ambiguity attitudes 
that fits the data and explains issues such as the equity premium puzzle.3  
Given the success in the applied fields, more experimental investigations about 
the behavioral foundation of the two-stage preference theories are needed. Recently, 
Halevy (2007) has an ingenious experimental design to test the predictions of various 
two-stage preference theories for consistency, where subjects are asked to reveal their 
certainty-equivalent evaluations for gambles from the original Ellsberg urns to urns 
with objective second-order priors that have the same mean as the 50-50 urn. He 
manages to sort each of his subjects into one of the existing (second-order) preference 
theories surveyed in his paper.  
However, all previous experiments on ambiguity aversion we are aware of, 
including Halevy (2007) as well as variations like “bundling” by Halevy and 
Feltcamp (2005), share the feature that the ambiguous prospect can be associated with 
a first-order lottery that is of either lower mean or higher variance than the original 
risky prospect. Thus, they still leave enough slack for, say, a pessimistic belief of the 
maxmin first-order lottery to step in as rationalization for the paradox. One extreme 
test for robustness of the second-order preference theories’ validity is to design an 
experiment that eliminates this room for maneuvering  
This is exactly the purpose of the present paper. We construct a decision problem 
that is a simple modification of Ellsberg’s two-color problem. The risky urn contains 
5 red and 5 white balls, while the ambiguous urn contains 10 balls of an unknown 
combination of the two colors. Instead of drawing only once in the urn of the decision 
maker’s choice, we ask them to draw twice with replacement. Crucial is the rule that a 
different color wins the same amount of 50 Yuan in each different draw. In our 
experiment, red drawn first and white drawn second will ensure a payoff of 100 Yuan.  
Table 1 summarizes all possible first-order lotteries given this payoff rule, with 
iπ  coding for the lottery with i red balls and 10-i white balls. There are exactly 11 of 
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3 See Chen, Ju, and Miao (2009), Hansen (2007), Hansen and Sargent (2008), Ju and Miao (2009). 
them. Each column lists the distribution of monetary outcome, its mean and its 
variance. For example, the urn with 4 red and 6 white balls, 4π , gives us the 
probabilities of .24, .52, and .24 to earn the prize of 0, 50, and 100 Yuan, respectively; 
with a mean of 50 Yuan and a variance of 34.64. Obviously, our modified Ellsberg 
risky prospect, 5π , has the highest variance of 35.36, while all color compositions 
yield the same mean payoff.  
Table 1: Complete List of Potential First-order Lotteries 
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Our experiment consists of three decision problems, sequentially presented to the 
subjects. We first elicit subjects’ risk attitude regarding simple lotteries using a 
modified BDM mechanism. We then let them make a decision between the risky and 
ambiguous urn in the modified Ellsberg problem, followed by a decision between the 
risky urn and one with uniformly distributed compound lottery. Both the first-order 
theory of SEU and the two-stage ones of MEU/CEU and REU turn out to have the 
same prediction that (first-order) risk-averse subjects should prefer the ambiguous and 
the uniform compound urns to the risky urn in our design!  
We ran this experiment in two different treatments, one in the classroom with 12 
out of 150 participants randomly chosen for monetary payment and another under lab 
conditions with all 75 subjects paid according to their decisions. Among the 137 (72) 
subjects in the random-pay (pay-all) treatment with consistent revelation of risk 
0π  1π  2π  3π  4π  5π  6π  7π  8π  9π  10π
Red 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
White 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
p(0) 0 .09 .16 .21 .24 .25 .24 .21 .16 .09 0 
p(50) 1 .82 .68 .58 .52 .50 .52 .58 .68 .82 1 
p(100) 0 .09 .16 .21 .24 .25 .24 .21 .16 .09 0 
mean 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
std 0 21.21 28.28 32.40 34.64 35.36 34.64 32.40 28.28 21.21 0 
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attitude, 53 (25), 42 (25) and 42 (22) turn out to be risk averse, neutral, and seeking 
respectively. Among the risk-averse subjects, 53% (44%) prefer the risky urn over the 
ambiguous one, while 45% (36%) prefer it over the urn with objective second-order 
risk, in separate decision problems. Among the risk-seeking subjects, 55% (36%) 
prefer the ambiguous urn, while 57% (50%) prefer the urn with objective 
second-order risk, respectively. Both violate the theory predictions. With 99% 
confidence, at least 58% (40%) of non-risk-neutral subjects have violated the theory 
predictions at least once over the two main decisions.  
These findings cast serious doubt on rational preference theories as the exclusive 
explanation for decisions under uncertainty involving ambiguity and compound 
lotteries. It appears that many subjects never activated the arithmetic mode of explicit 
risk assessment, in face of ambiguity. This seems consistent with arguments from 
psychologically motivated experiments on ambiguity that probabilities involved are 
not the only factors that help shape decisions. 
Heath and Tversky (1991), for instance, attribute the ambiguity preference to the 
competence which the subjects felt towards the source of the ambiguity. Fox and 
Tversky (1995) consider the Ellsberg phenomenon an inherently comparative effect 
and state that it does not arise in an independent or separate evaluation of uncertain 
prospects (the comparative ignorance hypothesis).4 Psychological studies in general 
identify multiple processes (some more effortful and analytic, others automatic, 
associative, and often emotion-based) being in play for decisions under risk or 
uncertainty (Weber and Johnson, 2008).  
Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel and Camerer (2005) find that the level of ambiguity 
in choices correlates positively with activation in the areas relating the integration of 
emotional and cognitive input (the orbitofrontal cortex, OFC) and reaction to 
emotional information (the amygdala). Their data show that the amygdala and OFC 
reacted rapidly, yet the dorsal striatum (activation in this area is correlated with the 
 
4 See Chow and Sarin (2002) and Stecher, Shields and Dickhaut (2010) for more discussions on factors 
inducing ambiguity aversion. 
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expected value of actual choices and reward prediction) reacted slowly. The control 
group of patients with OFC lesions in fact did not distinguish between degrees of 
uncertainty (ambiguity and risk) and behaved consistently with SEU theory. This 
evidence suggests that, when facing ambiguity, the amygdala and OFC activate first 
and deal with missing information independent of its risk implication. In another 
study, Huettel et al. (2006) show, that activation within the lateral prefrontal cortex 
was predicted by ambiguity preference, while activation of the posterior parietal 
cortex was predicted by risk preference.5 
In the next section, we discuss our experimental design and derive the associated 
theoretical predictions. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. Experimental Design, Procedure, and Theoretical Predictions 
Subjects face three simple decision problems one after another. Problem 1 is 
meant to test their (first-order) risk attitude, in a modified BDM procedure (Becker, 
DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964). On a list of 20 cases of sure payoffs that ranges from 
5 to 100 Yuan in steps of 5 Yuan, subjects have to choose either the sure payoff or the 
risky one, Choice B for every case. Choice B is the risky urn with 5 red and 5 white 
balls. Its value is decided by the following rule. A person draws twice with 
replacement. If the first draw is red and the second is white, he gets 100 Yuan; if the 
two draws are of the same color, he gets 50 Yuan; but if the two colors are in the 
order of white first and red second, he gets 0. 
Problem 2 is our main test for predictions regarding ambiguity aversion. In this 
problem, subjects have to decide between Choice B as described above and Choice C. 
Choice C is the ambiguous urn containing 10 balls in the combination of unknown 
colors of red and white. It could be any number between 0 red balls (and 10 white 
balls) to 10 red balls (and 0 white balls). The drawing and payoff rules are exactly the 
 
5 Hsu, in private communication, pointed out that the difference in implicated brain parts between Hsu 
et al. (2005) and Huettel et al. (2006) might be due to the design difference that learning might have 
occurred over repeatedly facing the same task in the latter. In this sense, our design is closer to Hsu et 
al. 
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same as with Choice B. Note, however, the novel feature from our double-drawing 
lottery design of different color winning each round ensures that the mean of the 
lottery is always 50 Yuan, independent of the color composition in the urn. 
Consequently, all compound lotteries can be ordered as mean-preserving spreads to 
one another, with Choice B being associated with the highest possible variance. Table 
1 summarizes the statistical characteristics of potential first-order lotteries in our 
design. 
Problem 3 is a test on preference over objective compound lotteries, where 
subjects are to choose between (the simple risk) Choice B and (the second-order risk) 
Choice D. Again, the drawing and winning rules are the same, but the number of red 
and white balls under Choice D is determined as follows: one ticket is drawn from a 
bag containing 11 tickets with the numbers 0 to 10 written on them. The number on 
the drawn ticket will determine the number of red balls in the urn. For example, if the 
number 3 is drawn, then there will be 3 red balls and 7 black balls in the urn. 
Procedure 
We ran two treatments that differ only in the number of subjects chosen for real 
payment after making decisions as described above. In the random-pay treatment (RP) 
conducted in classrooms, subjects were informed right after the instruction about 
Problem 1, that only three in the classroom (12/150 in total) would be randomly 
chosen to have their decisions implemented and get paid. In the pay-all treatment 
(PA), participants were recruited in the traditional manner for lab experiments. All 
subjects got paid following the implementation of their decisions after the session.6  
A total of 225 subjects participated. The RP treatment, conducted in October 2009, 
had four experimental sessions with a total of 150 students who voluntarily stayed for 
about a half hour after classes at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. In 
three sessions, subjects made decisions in the sequence of Problems 1, 2 and 3, while 
in the fourth session the sequence was Problems 1, 3 and 2. The PA treatment was run 
 
6 Due to time constraints, subjects had the option to implement their decisions either one by one right 
after the session or later at the experimenter’s office with an impersonal ID card we handed out. 
with 75 students in two sessions, in November 2010. Subjects made decisions in the 
sequence of Problem 1, 2 and 3. All participants were first-year college students of 
various majors ranging from economics and management to science and language.  
Our instructions were done with a PowerPoint presentation. After the explanation 
of each problem, students were instructed to make their decisions right away and to 
hand them in before they got instructions for the next problem. Details of the 
instructions can be found in the appendix. 
To increase credibility, we demonstrated drawings with the urn to be used later in 
Choices B and D during instructions. Choice C urn was secretly prepared before the 
session and placed on the counter for all to see until the end. After all decision sheets 
were collected, random drawings determined subjects for real payment in each RP 
session. Then, subjects were called upon to have their decisions implemented one by 
one. They got paid in cash according to the realization of their decisions and were 
dispatched, unless they opted not to wait and would rather do so in the experimenter’s 
office later instead. Average payoff for all 87 subjects with real payment in the two 
treatments was 62.2 Yuan.7 
Theoretical Predictions  
Given the structure of our two-draw design, only three outcomes   
are possible from the gambles B, C and D. Let 
{0,50,100}X =
{ , 0,...,10}iS iπ= =
i
denote the feasible 
set of first-order lotteries under our design, where π  refers to the lottery with i red 
and (10-i) white balls in the urn. Given the rule that red wins the first draw and white 
the second, for each iπ , the probability is (10 ) /100iiq i= −  for either of outcomes of 
0 and 100 Yuan, and 1-2  for the outcome of 50 Yuan. Due to our symmetrical 
design, {i-red, (10-i)-white} and {(10-i)-red, i-white} urns induce stochastically 
iq
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7 Note that 1 USD = ca. 6.8 Yuan. Regular student jobs paid about 7 Yuan per hour and average first 
jobs for fresh graduates paid below 20 Yuan per hour. As a side note, students indeed regularly 
requested to inspect the content of the ambiguous urn C after the decision implementation. 
equivalent prospects, in all aspects relevant for decision under risk. Mean for iπ  is 
the same 50 for all i. But the variance increases from i= 0 to i=5 and then 
symmetrically decreases from i=5 to i=10. In other words, a more color-balanced urn 
represents a mean-preserving spread gamble to a less balanced urn. Table 1 
summarizes the risk characteristics of all 11 elements in S. 
According to the subjective expected utility (SEU) theory by Savage (1954), 
decision makers assign subjective (first-order) probability C Sπ ∈  where S denotes 
the convex hull of S and evaluate Choice C with Cπ  together with a utility function u 
defined on the outcome space X. Note, a compound second-order lottery is a 
probability distribution ( )Sμ ∈Δ with support in the space of first-order lotteries S. 
Thus, Choice D can be formally identified as . As SEU 
satisfies the axiom of reduction of compound lotteries (ROCL) in case of objective 
compound lotteries, the DM evaluates Choice D with the first-order probability 
10
0(1/11, ) ( )D i i Sμ π == ∈Δ
10
0
/11D i i Sπ π== ∈∑ . Since mean of Dπ is 50 and 5rvar var /11 vaD iiπ π π<=∑ , 5π is 
a mean-preserving spread to Dπ . Consequently, a risk-averse DM is to prefer D to B, 
while risk-seeking ones are to prefer B to D, in Problem 3. Similarly, as any feasible 
subjective probability in S turns out to be a strict mean-preserving contraction to 
5π unless it degenerately puts all weight on the latter, a risk-averse (-seeking) DM is 
also to prefer C to B (B to C), in Problem 2. This exactly illustrates the fundamental 
difference to Ellsberg’s design where a subjective probability can be associated with 
the ambiguity prospect that may yield higher mean or lower variance than the 
benchmark risky prospect. 
The theories of Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) by Gilboa and Schmeidler 
(1989) and of Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) by Schmeidler (1989) attempt to 
rationalize the Ellsberg paradox by generalizing SEU into a set-valued theory, based 
on axioms. In particular, the DM could change to another “pessimistic” belief of 
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which first-order probability Sπ ∈ to use for risk assessment, depending on different 
presentation of the ambiguous case. However, due to design, the most pessimistic 
such evaluation of Choice C for a risk-averse DM is always 5π . Consequently, 
MEU/CEU predicts that the risk-averse DM prefers C to B, just like SEU does. 
Moreover, since MEU/CEU merely extends SEU under ambiguity, its prediction for 
Problem 3 is the same as SEU’s, too. 
Under the model of Recursive Expected Utility (REU) for decisions under 
second-order uncertainty by KMM (2005) that has found wide use in applied fields, 
the preference of a rational DM under risk or uncertainty is characterized by two 
different expected utility functions. For any first-order lottery Sπ ∈ , the DM may use 
a von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility index to calculate its certainty equivalent 
. Then, for each second-order lottery
u
( ) ( )
x
C u xπ π=∑ x ( )Sμ ∈Δ , the DM may use 
another utility index to calculate the ultimate expected utility as  )(⋅v
 
supp
( ) ( ) ( )U V cππ μμ μ π∈=∑  
For our problem, the certainty equivalent value of first-order gamble iπ  is 
calculated as . Under the assumption of concavity 
and monotonicity of , which also implies first-order risk aversion for the DM, 
and given the ranking of the variance in S, we derive the following ranking of 
associated certainty equivalents. 
[ (0) (100)] (1 2 ) (50)i i iC q u u q u= + + −
)(⋅u
  and 543210 CCCCCC >>>>> ii CC −= 10 for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
 If  is concave and monotone, and the decision maker evaluates a bet on the 
bundle from the ambiguous urn using an arbitrary prior 
)(⋅v
( )Sμ ∈Δ , expected value of 
Choice C is 10
0
( ) ( ) ( )iiU v C iμ μ π== ⋅∑ . Since for all , we have 5( )( )iv C v C> 5i ≠
10 
 
11 
 
B  
10
5
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )i i
i
U v C v C Uμ μ π
=
= ⋅ > =∑
For Choice D, μ  is the special case of the uniform distribution on S. As a result, a 
REU decision maker who has risk averse utility functions )(⋅v  and  will rank 
the three choices as follows, U(D)>U(B) and U(C)>U(B).
)(⋅u
8 In summary, we have our 
following theoretical prediction to test. 
Hypothesis According to the theories of SEU, MEU/CEU, and REU, risk-averse 
individuals (CE<50 in Problem 1) are to choose C over B in Problem 2 and D over B 
in Problem 3, while risk-seeking individuals (CE>50 in Problem 1) are to choose B 
over C or D in both Problem 2 and 3.9 
Note that any decision in Problems 2 and 3 by a Problem-1 risk-neutral individual is 
trivially consistent with the theory prediction. And the theories predict that people 
with non-neutral risk attitudes should have a strict preference among the two choices 
in both Problems 2 and 3, which makes it redundant to provide the option of 
indifference between the two choices in Problems 2 and 3 in the design. 
 
3. Experimental Results 
 Problem 1 elicits individuals’ risk attitude. The certainty equivalent value 
(thereafter CE) of the risky lottery (Choice B) in our experiment is defined as the 
lowest value, at which one starts to prefer sure payoff to the lottery. The majority of 
subjects revealed monotone behavior of switching from B to A with increasing sure 
payoffs. Only 13 out of 150 subjects (8.6%) in the random-pay treatment and 3 out of 
75 subjects (4%) in the pay-all treatment switched back from A to B,10 which are 
                                                        
8 In fact, v only needs to be monotone for this result to be correct, due to the special structure of our 
gamble design. Note, if ( )Sμ∈Δ is allowed, then Jensen’s inequality is needed to prove the claim, 
which requires v to be convex. 
9 In fact, the same can be proved for the so-called Recursive Non-Expected Utility (RNEU) by Segal 
(1987, 1990). For the sake of brevity, we elect to not discuss its tedious proof here. 
10 Note that the t-test yields p-value of 0.1004 indicating no significant difference. The 90% confidence 
12 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
deemed anomaly and excluded from our data analysis. Subsequent analysis only uses 
the remaining samples of 137 subjects in RP and of 72 subjects in PA, respectively.  
The average certainty equivalent value for the RP treatment (PA treatment) is 46.3 
(49.65) with standard deviation of 16.1 (11.11). We have 38.68% (34.72%) of the 
subjects with CE<50, 30.66% (34.72%) with CE=50 and 30.66% (30.56%) with 
CE>50, which correspond to the attitudes of risk aversion, risk neutrality and risk 
seeking respectively.11 Wilcoxon signed-rank test reveals no significant difference 
between RP and PA regarding subject risk attitudes (p=0.2867). Figure B1 in the 
appendix shows the distributions of subjects’ CE values. 
 As a methodological note, most experiments on the Ellsberg paradox use the 
standard BDM mechanism in which the subject is asked to state a minimum 
certainty-equivalent selling price to give up the lottery he has been endowed with.12 
This auction procedure provides a formal incentive for the subject to truthfully reveal 
their CE of the lottery. However, in its original form it appears hard for some subjects 
to comprehend. In a pilot study where subjects were to make binary decisions first and 
to reveal a BDM price for each of their choices second, 26 out of 89 subjects (29.2%) 
displayed inconsistent evaluations.13 Thus, we choose to use a modified version of the 
BDM mechanism to elicit subjects’ first-order risk attitude. First, instead of asking 
subjects to reveal a single selling price, we ask them to make 20 simple binary 
decisions, where a randomizing device14 determines which of them is realized.15 In 
 
interval of the binomial proportion test is [.074, .151] for 13/150 in RP, and [.011, .100] for 3/75 in PA. 
Thus, neither sample rejects with 10% significance the hypothesis that q ג [.074, .100] be the expected 
ratio of inconsistency. 
11 For comparison, Halevy (2007) uses the standard BDM mechanism. In a sample of 105 subjects, 
31.7%, 30.5%, and 38.5% of people are risk averse, neutral, and seeking, respectively.  
12 See summary in Stecher, Shields and Dickhaut (2010) for example. 
13 More specifically, aside from Problem 2 and 3 binary decisions as in this paper, subjects in the pilot 
faced another choice between urn B and an urn with equal likelihood of either 3 or 7 red balls. After the 
binary decision is made, the subject has to announce their selling price for their preferred prospect.  
14 To quote Harrison and Rustrom (2008), “For the instrument to elicit truthful responses, the 
experimenter must ensure that the subject realizes that the choice of a buying price does not depend on 
the stated selling price. If there is reason to suspect that subjects do not understand this independence, 
the use of physical randomizing devices (e.g., die or bingo cages) may mitigate such strategic 
thinking.” And the 29.2% inconsistency rate encountered in the mentioned pilot using the original 
addition, the binary decision in our modified BDM is similar in shape to the 
subsequent parts of the experiments, which facilitates the comparison to ambiguity 
attitudes.16  
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Figure 1: Distribution of Choice Profiles 
Figure 1 summarizes the distribution of individual behavior in both Problem 2 and 3 
decisions, separately grouped for different risk attitudes. Each subject’s behavior is 
characterized by one of the four types of choice combination BB, BD, CB and CD, 
which they made in Problem 2 and Problem 3 respectively. Simple regression reveals 
that orders of Problem 2 and 3 have no significant effect on decisions, so that we can 
pool data from all sessions within each treatment. 17  Moreover, the chi-square 
goodness-of-fit test yields p-values of 0.7739 (0.3449), 0.4298 (0.2035) and 0.062 
(0.1529), for the risk-averse, -neutral and -seeking samples in RP (PA), which reject 
the null hypotheses of pure behavior randomization in any case. 
Table 2 summarizes all relevant cases of violations against the theoretical 
Hypothesis, along with the lower bounds of their 99% and 95% binomial proportion 
                                                                                                                                                               
BDM fittingly echoes this reasoning. 
15 Sapienza, Zingales and Maestripieri (2009) use a similarly modified BDM method, which they 
consider an adaptation from the mechanism used in Holt and Laury (2002). 
16 Weber and Johnson (2008) argue that, when measuring levels of risk taking with the objective of 
predicting risk taking in other situations, it is important to use a decision task that is as similar as 
possible to the situation for which behavior is being predicted. 
17 See Table B1 in Appendix B. 
13 
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confidence intervals.  
Table 2: Violations to Hypothesis and Confidence Intervals 
 Sample size Problem 2 Problem 3 
Problems 
2&3 
Random-pay
risk averse 
53 52.83% [28]
(.3466/.3864)
45.28% [24] 
(.2786/.3156)
71.7% [38] 
(.5339/.5765) 
     
Random-pay
risk seeking 
42 54.76% [23]
(.3423/.3867)
57.14% [24] 
(.3644/4096) 
71.43% [30] 
(.5062/.5542) 
     
Random-pay
combined 
95 53.68% [51]
(.4008/.4315)
50.53% [48] 
(.3705/.4007)
71.58% [68] 
(.5825/.6140) 
     
Pay-all  
risk averse 
25 44% [11] 
(.1974/.2440)
36% [9] 
(.1399/.1797)
60% [15] 
(.3298/.3867) 
     
Pay-all  
risk seeking  
22 40.91% [9] 
(.1618/.2071)
50% [11] 
(.2293/.2822)
59.09% [13] 
(.3046/.3635) 
     
Pay-all  
combined 
47 42.55% [20]
(.2451/.2826)
42.55% [20] 
(.2451/.2826)
59.57% [28] 
(.3989/.4427) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses (-/-) refer to lower bounds of 99% and 95% confidence intervals. 
Numbers in [-] refer to size of violation observations. Under risk aversion, violation refers to 
choices of B in Problem 2 or 3, and to non-CD choice profiles under Problems 2&3. Under risk 
seeking, violation refers to choices of C in Problem 2 or D in Problem 3, and to non-BB under 
Problems 2&3. 
We consistently observe at least 40% violations in all but one situation (36%). 
The Pay-all treatment seems to induce slightly lower numbers of violations than the 
Random-pay treatment does, across the board. Yet, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
reveals no significant difference between the treatments, with p=0.4696 (p=0.4416), 
p=0.7789 (p=0.8200), and p=0.2963 (p=0.5886) for risk-averse, -neutral and –seeking 
subjects in Problem 2 (Problem 3), respectively.  
Note the boundaries [y, z] of any (100-x)% confidence interval can be interpreted 
as implying that a hypothetical parameter within [y, z] cannot be statistically rejected 
to the significance level of x%, while it can be rejected outside of [y, z] to the level of 
x%. Consequently, we conclude that our data cannot reject at the 5% significance 
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level that at least 38.64% (24.4%) risk-averse and 38.67% (20.71%) risk-seeking 
subjects would regularly violate the theoretical prediction in Problem 2 under the RP 
(PA) treatment. The situation does not change much if subjects face Problem 3 where 
the ambiguous choice C of Problem 2 is replaced by choice D with objective 
second-order risk. With 95% confidence, we expect at least 31.56% (17.97%) of 
risk-averse and 40.96% (28.22%) of risk-seeking people to behave in violation of the 
prediction of second-order preference theories under risk, in treatment RP (PA). 
Moreover, among the revealed non-risk-neutral people, we expect with 95% 
confidence that at least 61.4% (44.27%) would violate the theory predictions at least 
once after facing both Problems 2 and 3 in RP (PA). 
In summary, our data reject the theoretical predictions of the Hypothesis and 
suggest that a substantial share of people regularly behave in a way that is inconsistent 
with all preference theories. 
4. Concluding Discussion 
Ambiguity aversion has often been rationalized with second-order 
probabilistic sophistication approaches of rational preference theory. Our results 
cast serious doubt on their universal applicability. Even in fairly simple decision 
problems as our Problems 2 and 3, there is a substantial share of individuals 
whose behavior cannot be explained with any existing (second-order) economic 
preference theory. 
Recent neuroimaging studies like Hsu et al. (2005) and Huettel et al. (2006) 
compare brain activation of people who choose between ambiguous vs. risky 
options and suggest that these two types of decision making follow different 
brain mechanisms and processing paths. Our findings suggest that this 
dichotomy in brain activity may be triggered for a sizeable share of people even 
when ambiguity is completely dissociated from higher risk as in Problem 2 here. 
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Appendix A: Instructions (Slides translated from Chinese original) 
[Slide 1]  Problem 1: Making a choice between option A and urn B 
 
♦ Urn B contains 5 red balls and 5 white balls.  
 
 
 
♦ Payoff rule for urn B: Two balls are to be drawn from urn B with replacement. 
You get 50 Yuan if the first ball drawn is red and nothing if it is white. 
Conversely, you get 50 Yuan if the second ball drawn is a white and nothing if it 
is red. You get paid the sum of money earned in the two draws. 
B 
 
 
 
 
[Slide 2] Decision sheet for Problem 1 
Make a choice by checking either option A or urn B in each row 
Situation Payoff of Option A Option A Urn B 
1  5 Yuan   
2  10 Yuan   
3  15 Yuan   
… …   
9  45 Yuan   
10  50 Yuan   
…  …   
19  95 Yuan   
20  100 Yuan   
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[Slide 3] Rules for session ending implementation of decisions 
 
♦ [used in the RP treatment] Because of the time constraint, at the end of the 
experiment, we will randomly choose 3 students for real monetary payment. 
Every selected student will draw one of the three cards numbered 1, 2 3, which 
represent three decision problems in today’s experiment. We will pay you 
depending on the realization of your decision in that problem. 
 
[used in the PA treatment] In the end of the experiment, you will be paid based 
on the realization of your choices. You draw one of the three cards numbered 1, 2 
3, which represent three decision problems in today’s experiment. We will pay 
you depending on the realization of your decision in that problem. 
 
♦ For example, one draws a card of number 1 and would realize his payoffs from 
Problem 1. He is asked to draw one of the twenty cards representing 20 situations 
of option A, and he draws number 1. If his choice in situation 1 is “urn B”, then 
we will let him draw balls from urn B to realize his payoffs. If his choice in 
situation 1 is A, then we will pay him 5 Yuan immediately. 
 
[Slide 4] Problem 2: Make a choice between urn B and urn C 
♦ Urn C contains a mixture of 10 red and white balls. The number of red and white 
balls is unknown; it could be any number between 0 red balls (and 10 white balls) 
to 10 red balls (and 0 white balls). 
♦ Payoff rule for urn C: same as Payoff rule for urn B. 
 
[Slide 5] Decision sheet for Problem 2  
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Question: If you are asked to make a choice between urn B and urn C, which urn will 
you choose? 
 
 □Urn B                □Urn C 
 
CB
[Slide 6] Problem 3: Make a choice between urn B and urn D 
♦ Urn D contains a mixture of 10 red and white balls. The number of red and white 
balls is determined as follows: one ticket is drawn from a bag containing 11 
tickets with the numbers 0 to 10 written on them. The number written on the 
drawn ticket will determine the number of red balls in the urn. For example, if the 
number 3 is drawn, then there will be 3 red balls and 7 black balls in the urn. 
♦ Payoff rule for urn D: same as Payoff rule for urn B. 
 
[Slide 7] Decision sheet for Problem 3 
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Question: If you are asked to make a choice between urn B and urn D, which urn will 
you choose? 
 
□Urn B                □Urn D 
 
Gender       □Male                □Female 
 
DB 
21 3 4 0
Draw the number of red balls in urn D  
6 7 8 9 5
10
Appendix B: Further Data  
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Figure B1: Distribution of Certainty Equivalent Value in Problem 1   
On the order effect of Games 2 and 3 in random-pay treatment 
Whether the placement of Problem 2 and Problem 3 affects decisions is a justified 
concern. To control for this, in the random-pay treatment, we collected 100 
observations in the sequence of Problems 1, 2 and 3 and 37 observations in the 
sequence of Problems 1, 3 and 2, for reserved order between Problems 2 and 3.  
Logistic regressions reported in Table B1 confirm that no order effect is found, as 
the coefficients of the variable Order prove to be insignificant for both Problem 2 and 
3 decisions. Interestingly, Problem 1 CE level also has no effect on Problem 2 and 3 
behavior. There is, however, a significant gender effect in the Problem 3 decision, 
where females tend to choose B less frequently than D.  
Table B1: Binary logit model of Choice B in Problem 2 and Problem 3 
 Choice B in 
Problem 2 
Choice B in 
Problem 3 
Order -0.08  (0.387) 0.184 (0.398) 
CE -0.018 (0.055) -0.051 (0.057) 
Female 0.042 (0.353) -0.708* (0.360) 
Constant 0.304 (0.660) 0.502 (0.677) 
Observation 135 135 
R square 0.0009 0.0253 
* Significant at 10% level 
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